Volume 20
Issue 1 Winter 1990
Winter 1990

Direct Mail Advertising by Attorneys
Douglas Whitman

Recommended Citation
Douglas Whitman, Direct Mail Advertising by Attorneys, 20 N.M. L. Rev. 87 (1990).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol20/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING BY ATTORNEYS
DOUGLAS WHITMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Many attorneys erroneously believe that the law has always restricted them from engaging in advertising. Before 1830, American
lawyers, like their British counterparts, regarded themselves as an
elite group. Because they rejected the commercialization of law,
attorneys chose to prohibit advertising. By the mid-1800's, however,
some attorneys were advertising their services.' Nonetheless, in the
early twentieth century many states began to formally prohibit attorneys from engaging in advertising by adopting the American Bar
Association's first Code of Ethics in 1908.2 This prohibition on
advertising remained in place until the United States Supreme Court
decided Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.'
Since the decision in Bates, the legal profession has grappled with
the issue of attorney advertising. The approach followed by the
states seems to have been to restrict as much as possible the right
of attorneys to promote their practices through advertising. 4 The
focus of most of the regulations adopted by the states has been on
prohibiting false and deceptive statements by attorneys. This emphasis
overlooks the fact that an attorney might mislead the public without
ever making a false or deceptive statement. After briefly examining

* Douglas Whitman, Professor at the School of Business, the University of Kansas.
I. See H. Drinker, LEGAL ETHics 210-211 (1953). By 1984, the increase in lawyer advertising
had begun to level off. Reskin, Lawpoll: Lawyer Advertising Levels Off: P.R. Use Growing,
70 A.B.A. J. 48 (1984). Even so, by 1987 almost one third of all lawyers indicated they
had advertised their services at some point. Reidinger, Lawpoll, 73 A.B.A. J. 25 (1987).
2. See Note, Advertising Legal Services: The Case for Quality and Self-Laudatory Claims,
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 969-70 n.l (1985). CANoN 27 prohibited the use of advertising.
It is ironic that the American Bar Association chose to add restraints on the ability of
attorneys to compete with one another at the very same time that the federal government
passed the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, acts designed to prohibit restraints on
competition. Sherman Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890). as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), and
the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). To the
Supreme Court's credit, it later rejected the argument that restraints on advertising were
constitutional because lawyers are above trade. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350,
371-72 (1977).
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In this seminal case the United States Supreme Court recognized
the right of the public to receive advertising by attorneys. See generally Whitman, Advertising
by Professionals, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 39 (1978).
4. Lori Andrews, a research attorney at the American Bar Foundation, observed that
many of the state rules adopted after the Bates case were so restrictive that the very
advertisement in Bates would not have been permissible in most states. Andrews, Lawyer
Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 Am. B. FouNo. REs. J. 967, 970.
One must conclude from this that the bar in general opposed legal advertising and wanted
to discourage attorneys from using it if at all possible.
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the development of the law on attorney advertising, this article
explores what can be done about information that is true on its
face, but nonetheless misleading.
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
Until quite recently, lawyers believed that purely commercial speech
was not protected by the first amendment and therefore a state
could restrict commercial advertising in any manner desired. In 1942,
the Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen enunciated the commercial speech doctrine, holding that commercial speech was not
protected by the first amendment.' Although some commentators
have expressed the opinion that commercial speech should not be
protected, 6 other writers have applauded the Court's extension of7
the first amendment to matters other than strictly political speech.
Over time, the Court modified the commercial speech doctrine in
a series of cases which broadened constitutional protection for corn-

5. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Valentine the Court reviewed an ordinance that prohibited the
distribution of handbills that promoted a submarine tour. While the streets are a proper
place for the communication of information, the Court reasoned that when a person uses
the streets to communicate a commercial message, such a communication is not protected
by the first amendment. Id. at 54.
6. For example, Thomas Jackson and John Jeffries argued against protecting commercial
speech:
In the first place, commercial speech has no apparent connection with the
idea of individual self-fulfillment. Whatever else it may mean, the concept
of a first amendment right of personal autonomy in matters of belief and
- expression stops short of a seller hawking his wares. . . . Governmental
regulation of commercial advertising also does no violence to the protection
of political speech . . -. . For this kind of communication, the structure of
representative democracy yields no inference of inviolability because commercial speech concerns economic rather than political decisionmaking.
Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,
65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1979). See also Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 459-60 (1980).
7. Burt Neuborne made the following argument in favor of protecting commercial speech:
However, even within the confines of a strict utilitarian theory of the first
amendment, a degree of enhanced institutional protection for commercial
speech is appropriate on two levels. First, the respect for rational political
decision-making which underlies the Meiklejohn approach to political speech
seems equally applicable to speech which is necessary to rationalize economic
choices. . . . Second, even if one rejects equating political with economic
choice as a justification for providing enhanced institutional protection for
information likely to be of assistance to the chooser, knowledge about the
economic marketplace is critical to an informed opinion on the concededly
political issue of whether and to what extent the economic marketplace should
be regulated.
Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 437, 448 (1980). Laurence Tribe also argues that commercial speech should be protected.
-[Tlhe fact that the advertiser seeks a profit certainly can not justify stripping the communication of all first amendment protection." L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW
891 (1988).

Winter 1990]

DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING

mercial speech that involved advertising.' In Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. the Court
held that the first amendment extended its protection to purely
commercial advertisements. 9 Thus, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy the Court abandoned the commercial speech doctrine and set
the stage for a direct challenge to the restraints imposed by the
states on advertising by lawyers.
III. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING CASES
After Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, it was clear that the
Court intended to protect commercial as well as political speech
under the first amendment. The very next year the Court considered
an excellent test case involving lawyer advertising, Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona. 0
By 1975 the Court had given some inkling of its position with
respect to the regulation of legal activities in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar." In that case the Court considered the use of minimum
fee schedules by the states. The plaintiffs in Goldfarb were aggrieved
because no attorney in Fairfax County was able to perform a title
examination for them for a price lower than the price specified in
the Fairfax County minimum fee schedule. In spite of the Court's
finding that the state and county bar associations had a compelling
interest in regulating the practice of law, the Court nonetheless held
that such anticompetitive activity was within the reach of the Sherman

8. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in which the Court examined
an advertisement soliciting funds on behalf of a civil rights movement. The Court characterized
the advertisement as not commercial because it involved freedom of expression on a public
issue. Id. at 271. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973), dealt with a newspaper that was charged with violating an ordinance prohibiting
publication of sex-designated classified advertisements. The Court upheld the right of. a
governmental agency to stop newspapers from allowing advertisers to place help wanted
advertisements in sex-designated columns. The Court characterized the speech in this case as
not commercial even though it related to an advertisement. Id. at 384. In Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975). the Court overturned the criminal conviction of the editor of a Virginia
newspaper who had published an advertisement dealing with abortions. The Court noted that
the advertisement in this case dealt with a matter of public interest, and thus the publication
of this information could not be prohibited by the state of Virginia. Id. at 822.
9. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In that case, consumers of prescription drugs brought suit against
the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. These consumers objected to the rule adopted by the
State Board that prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription
drugs. The Supreme Court ruled that even though such advertising is clearly commercial,
because it is of general public interest, it is entitled to first amendment protection. Id. at
764-65.
10. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
11. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The facts of Goldfarb are stated in the opinion at pp. 775-80.
See generally Corley and Arnould, Professional Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 13 AM.
Bus. L.J. 21 (1975).
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Act.' 2 This case clearly indicated a new-found willingness by the

Supreme Court to set aside regulations that the state bars had
adopted.
The opportunity to further expand its control over the state bars
presented itself in the Bates case.' 3 In that seminal case, the Court
considered whether two Arizona attorneys, John Bates and Van
O'Steen, could be prohibited by the state of Arizona from advertising
their clinic in a newspaper. Bates and O'Steen placed an advertisement
that listed the price for the following services: divorces or legal
separations, uncontested divorces, adoptions, bankruptcies, and name
changes. This information was very useful to people contemplating
any of these suits. If nothing else, people could use the prices quoted
as a basis for comparison with the fees quoted by their own attorneys.
Perhaps many attorneys opposed such advertising for this very reason.
4
Arizona urged six separate grounds for sustaining the regulation.'
The Court was not persuaded by any of Arizona's arguments and

12. Id. at 790-91. In examining this opinion, attorneys may have concluded that states
still had a right to regulate attorneys. While it is true the state bars retained the right to
regulate lawyers, perhaps this view reflected the generalized wish that the Court would not
strip the state bars of their right to prohibit legal advertising.
In the Goldfarb case the Court sent another shock to the bar when it ruled that simply
because the law is a learned profession it is not exempt from the antitrust laws. The Court
observed:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from
a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular
restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice
of professions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We
intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are
confronted today.
421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17.
13. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The facts of Bates are stated in the opinion at pp. 353-58. At
a later date, the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court remarked with some bitterness
that the United States Supreme Court had no business telling the state how to regulate its
judicial system in the first place. K.C. TIMES, JANUARY 26, 1982, at 3A, col. 1. In an article
dealing with his thoughts about the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Donnelly
commented:
It is a fact that at some point in time after World War II the Supreme
Court of the United States ceased to function only as a court. It molded
itself into an organ for control of social policy and made that policy effectual
by utilization of the fourteenth amendment to amend the Constitution according to the predilections of its majority.
Donnelly, The State of the Judiciary in Missouri - 1982, J. Mo. B. March 1982, at 81, 84.
In response to this, Senator Eagleton of Missouri rejected suggestions made by Chief Justice
Donnelly to reduce the power of the United States Supreme Court. Miller, Supreme Court
is Defended, K.C. STAR, MARCH 12, 1982, at IlA, col. 1.
14. Arizona argued that the regulation should be upheld based on: (1) the adverse effect
on professionalism, (2) the inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising, (3) the adverse
effect on the administration of justice, (4) the undesirable economic effects of advertising,
(5) the adverse effect of advertising on the quality of service, and (6) the difficulties of
enforcement. 433 U.S. at 368-79.
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ruled that Bates and O'Steen could not be disciplined for placing
this advertisement in the newspaper. It did, however, limit its decision
to the issue of whether a state could prevent the publication in a
newspaper of a truthful advertisement concerning the availability
and terms of routine legal services." The Court indicated that states
could impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, outlaw
advertising dealing with illegal transactions,
and could prohibit false,
16
deceptive, or misleading advertising.
Two subsequent cases, In re Primus'7 and Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association, 8 resolved the issue of solicitation which had been
left unresolved in Bates. In In re Primus, a lawyer associated with
the American Civil Liberties Union sent a letter to Williams, a
woman who had been sterilized. The letter informed Williams that
the ACLU would represent her for free. A complaint was filed
against the lawyer with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Carolina. The United States
Supreme Court characterized the activities of the ACLU as forms
of political association and expression protected by the first amendment.' 9 Primus had not engaged in solicitation of a client as her
speech was exercised to advance the political beliefs of the ACLU. 20
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association2' dealt with an experienced
attorney who personally solicited the business of two young automobile accident victims, offering to represent them in a suit to
recover insurance money. He visited Carol McClintock in a hospital
room where she lay in traction, and he sought out Wanda Lou

15. Id. at 384. The Court expressly stated that it was not considering the issues of
advertising claims related to the quality of legal services or the problems associated with the
in-person solicitation of clients. Id. at 366. Even so, the Court indicated that it would be
unwise to make statements relating to quality when it observed that "[Aidvertising claims
as to the quality of services . . . are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly,
such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction. Similar objections
might justify restraints on in-person solicitation." Id. at 383-84.
16. Id. at 383-84.
17. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). The facts of In re Primus are stated in the opinion at pp. 41421.
18. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The facts of Ohralik are stated in the opinion at pp. 449-54.
19. 436 U.S. at 431.
20. The Court observed:
Unlike the situation in Ohralik, however, appellant's act of solicitation took
the form of a letter to a woman with whom appellant had discussed the
possibility of seeking redress for an allegedly unconstitutional sterilization.
This was not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. Appellant was communicating an offer of free assistance by attorneys associated with the ACLU,
not an offer predicated on entitlement to a share of any monetary recovery.
And her actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to
advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive
financial gain. [Footnote omitted]
436 U.S. at 422. This case can thus be understood without reference to the commercial speech
doctrine. The political activity engaged in by the lawyer in this case was subject to the full
protection of the first amendment, not the partial protection of the commercial speech doctrine.
21. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Holbert on the day she came home from the hospital. After they
hired him, these women wanted to discharge Ohralik, but he refused
to withdraw. Following a disciplinary hearing by the Board of
Commissioners on Grievance and Discipline of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, Ohralik was found in violation of in-person solicitation
rules. The United States Supreme Court distinguished in-person solicitation from the advertising that had been approved in Batesl
and ruled that Ohralik could be disciplined for engaging in solicitation
of accident victims. Ohralik illustrates the Court's belief that commercial speech does not deserve full first amendment protection.
Some regulation of speech, such as Ohio's prohibition on solicitation,
is constitutionally permissible.3
Friedman v. Rogers,4 is a noteworthy case to attorneys seeking
to promote their practices through the use of trade names. In
Friedman the plaintiff challenged a provision of the Texas Optometry
Act that prohibited the practice of optometry under a trade name.
The Supreme Court characterized the use of a trade name as a form

22. The Court distinguished advertising from solicitation:
Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and leaves
the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert
pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an
opportunity for comparison or reflection. The aim and effect of in-person
solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation and to encourage
speedy and perhaps uninformed decision making; there is no opportunity for
intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar, supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual.
436 U.S. at 457.
There is a considerable controversy between commentators as to whether solicitation should
be permitted or not. For example, Charles Pulaski, Jr. argued that an attorney must solicit
employment to survive. Thus, any restrictions on solicitation merely limit, but do not prohibit
entirely, situations in which an attorney may engage in solicitation. Pulaski, In-Person Solicitation and the First Amendment: Was Ohralik Wrongly Decided?, 1979 Aiuz. ST. L.J.
23, 55 (1979). See generally McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme
Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1985).
As McChesney observes, restrictions on promotional activities have competitive implications.
"A ban on a type of promotion deprives professionals of one means of competing in the
marketplace - vying to supply better information about themselves and their services." Id.
at 83.
23. Interestingiy, while the Court in Bates rejected the argument that advertising would
have an adverse effect on the professionalism of lawyers, 433 U.S. at 368, the Court in
Ohralik seems to regard the protection of professionalism as a legitimate basis for upholding
this regulation. 436 U.S. at 461.
This argument relates to the issue of whether states should be able to prohibit advertising
that is undignified. Adrian Foley, former chair of the American Bar Association Commission
on Advertising feels that attorney advertising should be dignified: "Part of the reluctance
of some lawyers to advertise is a traditional fear that advertising is undignified. Ensuring
dignity is very important if advertising is to become more widely accepted." Is Dignity
Important in Legal Advertising: Peer Pressure, 73 A.B.A. J. 53 (1987). The Supreme Court
of Iowa apparently agrees. It considered its rule DR 2-101(B) which provides in part: "Any
such information shall be presented in a dignified manner." The court upheld this rule, and
consequently its dignity requirement, in Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 377
N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), reh'g denied, 476 U.S. 1165 (1985).
24. 440 U.S. I (1979). The facts of Friedman are stated in the opinion at pp. 3-7.
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of commercial speech 2 and distinguished this case from Bates and
Virginia Board of Pharmacy. 6 The Court concluded that the law
prohibiting the use of a trade name was constitutional because the
state had a substantial interest in regulating this form of commercial
speech and because advertising alternatives were available.27 In 1980
the Supreme Court again ruled that commercial speech is entitled
to less protection than political speech. In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York" the
Court announced a four-part test to guide courts in analyzing com-

mercial speech cases:

25. Id. at 11.
26. The Court observed:
In those cases, the State had proscribed advertising by pharmacists and
lawyers that contained statements about the products or services offered and
their prices. These statements were self-contained and self-explanatory. Here,
we are concerned with a form of commercial speech that has no intrinsic
meaning. A trade name conveys no information about the price and nature
of the services offered by an optometrist until it acquires meaning over a
period of time by associations formed in the minds of the public between
ihe name and some standard of price or quality. Because these ill-defined
associations of trade names with price and quality information can be manipulated by the users of trade names, there is a significant possibility that
trade names will be used to mislead the public. [Footnote omitted]
Id. at 12-13. The Court also observed that an optometrist was still free to advertise information
about "the type of service he offers, the prices he charges, and whether he practices as a
partner, associate, or employee with other optometrists," even though he could not use a
trade name. Id. at 16.
27. Id. at 15-16. This decision was widely criticized by commentators. The author of a
note in the Texas Law Review accused the Court of abandoning the reasoning of its earlier
cases. "On balance, the Friedman opinion is confusing: the Court announced that it would
rely on the Virginia Pharmacy and Bates decisions, but sub silentio rejected the primary rule
from all of the previous commercial speech cases-that consumer deception should be remedied
by requiring more speech, not less." Note, Reuniting Commercial Speech and Due Process
Analysis: The Standard for Deceptiveness in Friedman v. Rogers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1456,
1473 (1979); Comment, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Narrowing the Scope of First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Expression-Friedman v. Rogers, 99 S.Ct. 887 (1979),
13 Suiroux U.L. REV. 1503, 1522-23 (1979)(suggesting that optometrists could have been
required to reveal more information); Note, Constitutional Law-Commercial Speech-Trade
Names are not a Piotected Form of Commercial Speech, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 717, 72627 (1979)(accusing the Court of abandoning the standard of review it had adopted in the
past for reviewing commercial speech cases); Note, Professional Trade Names: Unprotected
Commercial Speech. 59 NEB. L. REV. 482, 504-05 (1980)(discussing the impact that Friedman
might have on the use of trade names by lawyers); see also Sign of the Times - Law Logos,
73 A.B.A. J. 44 (August 1987) for a brief discussion of the increasing use of law logos by
attorneys.
28. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). This case dealt with a regulation promulgated by the Public
Service Commission of New York that ordered all electric utilities in New York to stop
engaging in advertising that promoted the use of electricity in order to promote the conservation
of energy. The Court found no unlawful or deceptive speech in this case. It ruled that the
state's interest in preserving the program of energy conservation was substantial. The Court
overturned this rule because this complete suppression of speech was more extensive than
was necessary to further the state's interest in energy conservation and the state did not
establish that a more limited restriction on speech would not adequately serve the state's
interests. Id. at 570. The Court therefore found the order of the Commission to be unconstitutional. Id. at 570.
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In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression
is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.29
This test has been employed in subsequent attorney advertising cases.
An attorney advertising case in which Central Hudson was followed
is In re R.M.J.30 R.M.J. was a Missouri attorney who advertised
areas of practice other than those specified in Rule 4 of the Supreme
Court of Missouri, a laundry list type of rule that allowed only
certain areas of law to be advertised and that required the precise
wording of the rule be adhered to by the advertiser." R.M.J. placed

29. Id. at 566. It has been argued that the Court erred in adopting this standard for
commercial speech and in fact the Court should have accorded commercial speech full
constitutional protection. First of all, commercial speech serves the same function in the
economic marketplace that political speech serves in the marketplace of ideas. The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REV. 77, 165 (1980). Secondly, full protection of commercial
speech will help the democratic process function better:
An even more important purpose of the first amendment is to ensure the
proper functioning of the representative process by precluding the state from
regulating the content of expression. Content-based regulation poses the danger
that government officials will suppress views that undermine their status in
office. Since commercial messages necessarily contain social and political
implications, they possess the same potential as other forms of speech to
challenge those in political power and constitute a portion of the public
dialogue on policy issues. In fact, the ban on promotional advertising contested
in Central Hudson was based in part on the PSC's finding that the message
of such advertisements was "misleading" in that it conflicted with the government's position that energy was in short supply.
Id. at 165-66.
Another commentator criticized this opinion on the grounds that the Court assumed that
advertising conveys a lot of information when in fact it does not.
Central Hudson's protective attitude toward advertising's informational function in general seems somewhat overzealous. Advertisements which, in the
Court's phrases, are neither "more likely to deceive the public than inform
it," nor are "related to illegal activity," do not always convey any significant
information. . . . In practice, comparatively little commercial promotion
performs a purely informational function, and it has been pointed out that
"the majority of advertising emphasizes persuasional and noninformational
techniques, generally to the exclusion of relevant facts about the goods or
services. "
Note, Recent Developments, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, II ENvrL. L. 767, 774 (1981).
30. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). See generally Whitman and Stoltenberg, The Present Constitutional
Status of Lawyer Advertising - Theoretical and Practical Implications of In re R.M.J., 57
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 445 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Whitman, Constitutional Status] and
Whitman and Stoltenberg, Direct Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 381
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Whitman, Direct Mail].
31. 455 U.S. at 195. For. example, R.M.J. used the term "personal injury" rather than
the approved phrase "tort law." Id. at 191.
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several advertisements in local newspapers and in the yellow pages
of the telephone directory that did not conform to the precise
requirements of the disciplinary rules. He also mailed professional
announcement cards to a larger group of persons than was allowed
by DR 2-101(A)(2).12
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the rules of the Missouri
Supreme Court in light of its earlier decisions. The Court essentially
applied the Central Hudson test to attorney advertising:
Commercial speech doctrine, in the context of advertising for
professional services, may be summarized generally as follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently
misleading or when the experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the states may impose appropriate
restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.
But the states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of
areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in
a way that is not deceptive . . . Although the potential for
deception and confusion is particularly strong in the context of
advertising professional services, restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent
the deception."
Such language effectively answered the fears of commentators that
the Court's decision in Friedman v. Rogers presaged a movement
away from the least-restrictive-means analysis. 3" But when the Court
examined the facts of the case, it found itself unable to apply the
principles that allow a state to regulate in the commercial speech
area because the state of Missouri failed to show the advertisements
were misleading. Nor did Missouri advance any substantial state
interest to support its position."
In re R.M.J. also dealt with the issue of the use of direct mail
by attorneys. The Court rejected Missouri's prohibition of direct

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 198.
Id. at 203.
See supra note 27.
455 U.S. at 205. The Court noted:
Because the listing published by the appellant has not been shown to be
misleading, and because the Advisory Committee suggests no substantial
interest promoted by the restriction, we conclude that this portion of RULE
4 is an invalid restriction upon speech as applied to appellant's advertisements.
Nor has the Advisory Committee identified any substantial interest in a rule
that prohibits a lawyer from identifying the jurisdictions in which he is
licensed to practice. Such information is not misleading on its face.
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mail,3 6 concluding that since there were no findings that R.M.J.'s
speech was misleading or even inherently misleading,
the requirements
37
of the Central Hudson test had not been met.
Following In re R.M.J. the Supreme Court again dealt with attorney advertising in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio.38 In this case the Court considered two
advertisements placed by an attorney. 9 The more important advertisement of the two concerned an illustration of a Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device and stated that it was not too late to take action
against the manufacturer for injuries caused by the intrauterine
device.40 The advertisement also had an illustration of a Dalkon

36. It appears from the decision that the Court felt that direct mailings may not be
prohibited by the states:
Finally, appellant was charged with mailing cards announcing the opening
of his office to persons other than "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal
friends and relatives." Mailings and handbills may be more difficult to
supervise than newspapers. But again we deal with a silent record. There is
no indication that an inability to supervise is the reason the State restricts
the potential audience of announcement cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute
prohibition is the only solution. For example, by requiring a filing with the
Advisory Committee of a copy of all general mailings, the State may be
able to exercise reasonable supervision over such mailings. There is no
indication in the record of a failed effort to proceed along such a less
restrictive path.
Id. at 206.
37. 455 U.S. at 207. R.M.J. was a strong signal to the states to be less restrictive in
regulating attorney advertising. See Webster, Easing Restrictions on Attorney Advertising, 23
S. TEX. L.J. 453, 465 (1982).
38. 471 U.S. 626 (1985)..
39.Id. at 631. The initial charge accused him of violating DR 2-101(B) which required
that only certain information designated in the rule may appear in the advertising. This rule
also required that advertisements be presented in a dignified manner. OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBI.TY DR 2-101(B) (1982). This charge was dropped on appeal. It should
be noted that the Court in In re R.M.J. considered the use of a laundry list approach of
what facts may be presented in an advertisement. In that case, the Court considered the
reprimand of R.M.J. for deviating from the list of areas of practice in that rule. As there
was no evidence R.M.J.'s advertisement was misleading or that Missouri had a substantial
interest to be promoted by requiring strict adherence to this rule, the Court found the rule
as applied violated R.M.J.'s first amendment rights. 455 U.S. at 206-07. While the Court
did not invalidate the laundry list approach outright, it certainly cast doubt upon its validity.
See Whitman and Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts of Lawyer Advertising: The Supreme Court's
Latest Clarification, 19 IND. L. Rv.497, 546-51 (1986).
40. 471 U.S. at 631. The advertisement stated in part: "If you or a friend have had a
similar experience do not assume it is too late to take legal action against the Shield's
manufacturer." Id. This allegedly violated DR 2-103(A) which prohibits an attorney from
recommending himself to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment
of a lawyer. OHto CODE OF PROFESIONA. REsPoNsirimrrY DR 2-103(A) (1982). It also allegedly
violated DR 2-104(A) which prohibited an attorney from accepting employment after he has
given unsolicited advice to a layman to take legal action. OHIo CODE OF PROFESSIONAL.
RESPONSIBIIrY DR 2-104(A) (1982). The advertisement also indicated the firm would take
cases on a contingent fee basis and stated, "If there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed
by our clients." 471 U.S. at 631. This allegedly violated DR 2-l0l(B)(15) which required
that certain disclosures must be revealed in any advertisement concerning contingent fees.
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-l0l(B)(15) (1982). The advertisement was
to indicate that clients would be liable for court costs and expenses. OHIo CODE OF PROFESSIONA.L
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Shield, which was not permitted by Ohio's rules.' The second
advertisement dealt with drunk driving. It stated that Zauderer's
clients would receive a full refund of their legal fee if convicted.-2
The Court indicated that its approach to commercial speech was
well settled.4 3 On the issue of whether the Dalkon Shield advertisement
could properly be used to find Zauderer in violation of the rules
prohibiting self-recommendation and prohibiting the acceptance of
employment resulting from unsolicited legal advice, the Court ruled
for Zauderer." In light of the fact that the advertisements were

REsPoNSIBILTrrY DR 2-101(A) (1982). Interestingly, the advertisement generated over 200 inquiries
and Zauderer initiated lawsuits on behalf of 106 women as a result of placing the advertisement.
471 U.S. at 631. This illustrates the fact that violating the ethical codes can be economically
beneficial:
In fact, there is a certain advantage to engaging in activities other persons
regard as unethical or even illegal. In this case, the advantage is that other
people are not going to advertise. One might ask whether placing advertisements such as the one discussed in this case really makes economic sense.
As the Supreme Court gradually lowers the inhibitions of other lawyers,
more attorneys will advertise. The likely effect of this will be that advertising
as a whole will be far less effective - or perhaps not effective at all. It is
the failure of others to advertise, in the authors' opinion, that results in
such advertising being so successful.
Whitman and Stoltenberg, Evolving Concepts of Lawyer Advertising: The Supreme Court's
Latest Clarification, 19 IND. L. REV. 497 n.204 (1986).
41. 471 U.S. at 630. OHIO's CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) read in
part as follows:
The information disclosed by a lawyer in such publication or broadcast shall
comply with DR 2-101(A) and be presented in a dignified manner without
the use of drawings, illustrations, animations, portrayals, dramatizations,
slogans, music, lyrics or the use of pictures, except the use of pictures of
the advertising lawyer, or the use of a portrayal of the scales of justice.
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 2-101(B) (1982). It is interesting to note that

even the Bates case involved an illustration of the scales of justice. 433 U.S. at 385. Obviously,
one reason that DR 2-101(B) includes the reference to the scales of justice is that the Supreme
Court approved of such an illustration, by implication, in Bates.
However, illustrations certainly can grab the attention of readers. Illustrations help the
advertiser get his message to the readers. When Zauderer used an advertisement without the
Dalkon Shield illustration, he got no response to his advertising. See BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

at 14-15, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985). This suggests how
important illustrations can be to the success of an advertising campaign.
42. 471 U.S. at 630. This violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. In effect.
it was an improper offer to represent criminal defendants on a contingent fee basis. OHIO
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1982).

43. The Court stated:
The States and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination
of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading, or that proposes
an illegal transaction. Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and
does not concern unlawful activities, however, may be restricted only in the
service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that
directly advance that interest. 471 U.S. at 638 (citing Friedman v. Rogers.
440 U.S. 1 (1979); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376 (1973); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
44. 471 U.S. at 647. For a discussion of the issue of self-laudatory claims in advertising,
see generally Note, Advertising Legal Services: The Case for Quality and Self-Laudatory
Claims, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 969 (1985).
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neither false nor deceptive, the burden was on Ohio to establish
that prohibiting such statements in legal advertising directly advanced
a substantial state interest.4 5 It found that the state had failed to
establish that such a rule was necessary to achieve a substantial
governmental interest."
The Court rejected Ohio's blanket ban on illustrations. Applying
the Central Hudson test, the Court found that Ohio had failed to
47
present a substantial state interest which justified its restriction.
Since advertisements can be examined on a case-by-case basis, the
48
Court saw no reason for a complete prohibition of illustrations.
As to the failure of Zauderer to include in his advertising information warning potential clients that they would remain responsible
for the costs of a suit even if they lost, the Court declined to follow
the Central Hudson test in its analysis. The Court distinguished this
49
issue because Ohio was not preventing attorneys from speaking.
Because the disclosure furthered the state's interest, it was permissible. 10 Since an advertisement without the required disclosure could
easily mislead the public, it is reasonable for the state to require
that information concerning the client's liability for the costs of the
suit be disclosed in the advertising. 5 The Court affirmed the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision to discipline Zauderer for placing the drunk
driving advertisement.5 2
By dismissing the allegation that Zauderer accepted employment
after he recommended himself for employment, the Court implicitly
recognized the fact that advertisements are placed in order to generate
business. 3 This raises the question of whether a person may promote

45. 471 U.S. at 644.
46. Id. at 646-47. Perhaps one of the reasons that Ohio disapproved of this advertising
was because it was geared to specific people with particular legal problems. Thomas B.
Metzloff and Jeffrey M. Smith assert that attorneys must have the right to use creative
marketing methods in order for their advertising to be effective. Metzloff and Smith, The
Future of Attorney Advertising and the Interaction Between Marketing and Liability, 37
MERCER L. REV. 599, 605 (1986). Clearly, attorneys who advertise should address specific
advertisements to specific groups of persons since this can be a very effective method of
advertising. See Whitman and Stoltenberg, Direct Mail Advertising by Lawyers, 45 U. PrTr.
L. REV. 381, 416-19 (1984).
47. 471 U.S. at 649.
48. Id. The Court observed that consumers rarely base their decisions as to whether to
employ an attorney on visual illustrations in advertisements. Id. One might question whether
the Court is mistaken in this conclusion. If illustrations are so unimportant, why did Zauderer's
advertisement that lacked an illustration produce no response? Quite possibly, illustrations
are more important than the Court believes.
49. Id. at 651.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 654-55.
53. To quote Frederick C. Moss, "The Supreme Court has finally acknowledged the
obvious: a major purpose of all advertising is to attract customers. Therefore, attention
getting devices are legitimate adjuncts of protected commercial speech." Moss, The Ethics
of Law PracticeMarketing, 61 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 601, 637 (1986). Of course, it is possible
to generate business without engaging in theatrics. Dick and Gagen, Effective Lawyer Advertising, 33 PAc. LAW. 65, 66 (1987).
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his or her services through the use of some means other than an
advertisement in a newspaper. Specifically, a question left unanswered
was whether an attorney may convey the same information through
direct mail advertising that can be conveyed through newspaper
advertising. This issue is dealt with in the next section of this article.
IV. DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING BY ATTORNEYS
The decision in R.M.J. dealt in part with the issue of the use of
direct mail because R.M.J. mailed professional announcement cards
announcing the opening of his office to persons that he did not
personally know.5 4 The Court concluded that there was no evidence
any of R.M.J.'s mailings were misleading." Furthermore, the Court
stated an absolute prohibition is unnecessary in light of the fact the
6
state could require a copy of all mailings be filed with the state.1
If a state chooses to regulate
such activities, it must do so in the
57
least restrictive manner.

Prior to and even after the R.M.J. case a number of states
considered the issue of direct mail advertising by attorneys. Some
of the states have taken the position that direct mail advertising by
lawyers is permissible while others view it as impermissible conduct.
To give the reader some insight into the reasoning of the various
courts across the United States on this issue, a brief consideration
of these cases follows.
A. State Court Cases Permitting Direct Mail Advertising By
A ttorneys
The state courts that have permitted direct mail advertising tend
to have done so because the courts view the states' interest in
prohibiting such communications as rather insignificant in relation

54. Mo. ANN. RULES OF COURT, RULE 4, DR 4.27 (Vernon 1981) permitted lawyers to
send announcement cards only to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and
relatives." These cards could state "new or changed associates or addresses, change of firm
name, or similar matters." Id.
55. 455 U.S. at 206-07.
56. Id. at 206.
57. Id. It would seem rather clear after R.M.J. that attorneys could not be restricted
from engaging in direct mail solicitation of clients, although the states still retain the power
to review any mailings to make certain nothing improper is contained in such literature. See
Whitman, Direct Mail, supra note 30, where the author notes:
Lawyers must choose the language of any direct mailing carefully in order
to maintain accuracy and avoid any possible claim of false or misleading
content. In addition, even though the distinction between advertising and
solicitation has been characterized as artificial and meaningless, many states'
rules maintain it, thus, lawyers should avoid language of direct solicitation.
Finally, lawyers must appreciate the risks of creating conflicts of interest by
directing mailings to third parties whose assistance is sought in generating
clients.
Id. at 420.
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to the first amendment interests of advertising attorneys. Furthermore, many courts were influenced by the fact that a person receiving
such information could simply ignore the mailing. For this reason,
a blanket ban on direct mail has been treated by many courts as
more excessive than is necessary to protect the interests of the state.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart," attorneys Stuart and
Thompson sent letters to two real estate agencies. 9 These letters
stated their fees, qualifications, and the time they would require to
6 The Board of Governors of the bar asperform certain services. w
6
such letters as impermissible solicitation. 1
sending
sociation regarded
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, decided
that it could not equate this particular mailing with in-person solicitation, nor did it find any of the dangers associated with the
personal solicitation of clients to be present in a case dealing with
direct mail advertising by attorneys. 62 The information in the letters
could be verified, and unless the bar association could point to a
valid reason for prohibiting such mailings, such speech was therefore
63
treated as being constitutionally protected.
The court rejected the arguments that such mailings create a greater
potential for undue influence than newspaper advertising and that
enforcing a rule permitting direct mail advertising would be very
65
difficult. 64 On these grounds the court dismissed the complaint.
66
In a 1980 case from New York, Koffler v. Joint Bar Association,
the New York Court of Appeals evaluated the actions of an attorney
who sent out 7,500 letters to owners of real estate in which he
solicited their business in the sale of their property. At the same
time Koffler sent letters to real estate brokers in which he asked
the real estate brokers to send him their real estate clients. Koffler
testified that he did about 200 closings at the price stated in the
letters. The court rejected all arguments made by the bar association
and concluded that such mailings could not be prohibited. 67
In In re Appert 8 the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the
brochures mailed out by Appert and his partner which were distributed with circulars. This material discussed the attorneys' familiarity with Dalkon Shield litigation. In light of the significant

58. 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 933-34.
62. Id. at 934.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980). The facts of Koffler are
stated at 51 N.Y.2d at 143-44.
67. Id. at 147, 412 N.E.2d at 934.
68. 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981). The facts of Appert are stated in the opinion at pp.
205-07.
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interest of the public in receiving such information, the court concluded that the state's interest in prohibiting such mailings was not
sufficiently compelling
to justify a rule prohibiting the distribution
69
of this information.
In Grievance Committee For the Hartford-New Britain Judicial
District v. Trantolo,70 the court considered, among other charges,
the allegation that Joseph and Vincent Trantolo had done something
improper when they mailed announcements to twenty-five Hartford
realtors, some of whom they had not previously had a professional
or personal relationship with in the past. 71 The mailing
included a
7
brochure that explained the nature of their practice. 1
The Supreme Court of Connecticut treated the announcements
and brochures as commercial speech that were entitled to constitutional protection.73 The court applied the Central Hudson test to
arrive at its conclusion that because Connecticut's rule was a blanket
prohibition of mailed solicitations it was an unnecessary restriction
on free speech. Connecticut's rule was struck down because it was
not the least restrictive possible rule that could be adopted to-deal
with this situation.7 4 Because the mailings were found to be not
misleading, the court reasoned that they were entitled to the protection accorded to commercial speech. 7 The court ruled that the
disciplinary rule failed the fourth part of the Central Hudson test
in that this rule, a blanket prohibition on the use of direct mail,
was more extensive than necessary to serve the interests of the state.
It therefore concluded that a blanket prohibition of mailed solicitations violates the first amendment.76
In In the Matter of Amendment to S.J.C. Rule 3:07, 77 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered its rule in light of the
Zauderer decision. The Massachussetts rule prohibited direct. -solicitation whether in person or by phone. Placing direct mail in the
category of indirect solicitation, the court reasoned that the recipient
of a piece of mail can always simply discard it. The court merely
required that such mailings be labeled as advertising and the attorney
keep a copy of the letters for two years.78
The position of these courts seems to be that truthful direct mail
advertising is protected by the first amendment. Under the Central
Hudson test, states are not free to prohibit such mailings outright

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.at 212.
192 Conn. 27,
Id. at 28, 470
Id.
Id. at 30, 470
Id. at 31, 470
Id. at 30, 470
Id. at 31. 470
398 Mass. 73,
Id. at 81, 495

470 A.2d 235 (1984).
A.2d at 236.
A.2d at 238.
A.2d at 239.
A.2d at 238.
A.2d at 239.
495 N.E.2d 282 (1986).
N.E.2d at 290-91.
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because such a rule would be more restrictive than necessary to
protect the interests of the state. These courts do not view direct
mail advertising as analogous to in-person solicitation, unlike many
of the courts that have ruled against the use of direct mail by
attorneys.
B. State Court Cases Not Permitting Direct Mail Advertising By
Attorneys
A number of states that have prohibited the use of direct mail
have done so because their courts equated the use of direct mail
with in-person solicitation. To these courts, the dangers posed by
direct mail are just as great as those posed by in-person solicitation.
Some other states were concerned about possible conflicts of interest
when mailings that requested referrals were sent to third parties.
Finally, some states viewed direct mail as permissible, but not if
the literature contained false and deceptive statements.
79
In a Louisiana case, Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Association,
the court considered the propriety of the actions of an attorney who
sent letters to people concerning prepaid legal plans for employees.
The court equated the actions of the attorney with those of a lawyer
who solicits business in person. It therefore concluded that such
activities could be prohibited as direct solicitation for pecuniary
gain. 0
In the same year Pennsylvania examined the activities of a group
of lawyers who, after leaving one firm, sent letters to the clients
of their former employer asking the clients to employ them. 8 The
court ruled that the actions of the attorneys violated Pennsylvania's
rules prohibiting self-recommendation and amounted to an interference with contractual relations between the firm and its clients.8 "
Arkansas considered the actions of an attorney who used a discount
coupon mailing to advertise his services. The Arkansas court held
the attorney could be disciplined for his actions.8 3
In 1981 the New York courts again considered the use of direct
mail by attorneys in the case Greene v. Grievance Committee for
the Ninth Judicial District. " In August of 1978 Alan Greene sent

79. 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978). The facts of Allison are stated in the opinion at pp. 48990.
80. Id. at 496.
81. Adler v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907
(1979).
82. Id. at 429-36, 393 A.2d at 1181-86.
83. Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
966 (1981). This case involved a number of other improper actions by the attorney which
the Arkansas court viewed as potentially deceptive, thus it has limited application to the
issue of the propriety of using direct mail.
84. 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981). The facts of Greene are
stated at 54 N.Y.2d at 121-22.
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approximately one thousand direct mail fliers to real estate brokers
in Westchester County and Putnam County. The letters indicated
the price Greene charged for full legal representation in property
transactions and the letters suggested that the brokers refer clients
to Greene. Greene never got any business from these letters.8 5
The New York Court of Appeals applied the four-part Central
Hudson test in resolving this case. The court did not examine whether
these letters were deceptive or misleading because this issue was not
alleged.8 6 However, the New York Court of Appeals found a valid
and compelling state interest in preventing conflicts of interest between an attorney and his client.8 7 The court thought that such
activities should be prohibited because the attorney could not separate
the interests of the client and the brokers, whose interests would
necessarily clash at some point. 8 In light of these considerations,
the New York Court of Appeals upheld the regulation as a proper
exercise of power.8 9
Another case in which the court found that an attorney used
direct mail improperly arose out of Ohio, Dayton Bar Association
v. Herzog. 9° Attorney Harold J.T. Herzog mailed between 500 and
1,000 letters to defendants in Dayton Municipal Court cases. The
letters suggested that the defendants could escape the collections
process due to a new federal law. The letters suggested the recipients
call his office. The court regarded his actions as improper because
he directly solicited or attempted to solicit professional employment. 91
In a case challenging the revisions of Utah's advertising rules, In
re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary
Rules on Advertising,92 the Utah Supreme Court held that the state
has a substantial interest in maintaining high standards for attorneys.
However, because it appeared that the new rule would even prohibit
the mailing of announcement cards, a matter which was permitted
by the Supreme Court in R.M.J., the court ordered the Utah Board
of Bar Commissions to resubmit revised rules on direct mail advertising. 93

85. Id.
86. Id. at 122, 429 N.E.2d at 394-95, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
87. Id. at 123, 429 N.E.2d at 395, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
88. Id. at 124, 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
89. Id. at 128-129, 429 N.E.2d at 395, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
90. 70 Ohio St. 2d 261, 436 N.E.2d 1037 (1982). The facts of Herzog are stated at 70
Ohio St. 2d 261-62.
91. Id. at 262, 436 N.E.2d at 1038. Herzog was disbarred because he had been suspended
before and reinstated in 1975 and had subsequently engaged in this and other improper
activities. The court regarded the letters sent by Herzog, even in light of the decision in
R.M.J., as "patent solicitation" which is not constitutionally protected speech. It viewed the
letters as creating the possibility of overreaching. The court noted that the Supreme Court
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978), permitted state rules
that prohibit solicitation. 70 Ohio St. 2d at 262 n.l, 436 N.E.2d at 1038 n.l.
92. 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982).
93. Id. at 995.
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In 1982 the Kansas Supreme Court dealt with a direct mail case
in State v. Moses.94 Attorney Earl Moses sent out 150 letters to
persons who had listed their homes with realtors. Moses had no
previous contact with any of the home-sellers. The letter listed Moses'
fee and told the recipients how to cancel their listings so that they
could sell their own homes. The letters also listed Moses' experience
in real estate sales and clearly identified him as an attorney, listed
his office address, and included his telephone number.
The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned in light of the decision in
R.M.J. that advertising is permissible but that solicitation is not
permissible because of the possibility of overreaching and undue
influence. 95 Direct solicitation is not a protected form of speech
because of the possible abuses that might occur if attorneys were
permitted to engage in it.9 The Kansas Supreme Court concluded
that the rule prohibiting direct solicitation was constitutional, that
Moses had engaged in direct mail solicitation of a stranger for
employment for a particular legal matter, and therefore his censure
was upheld. 07
In another case dealing with letters mailed to realtors, In re Alessi,9 8
the New York Court of Appeals considered the actions of Donald
A. Alessi and John P. Bartolomei. Alessi's and Bartolomei's legal
clinic mailed letters to 1,000 Albany New York realtors in an apparent
attempt to solicit clients. The letters quoted fees for various legal
services related to the closing of real estate transactions." The New
York Court of Appeals found that there was a great potential for
conflict of interest between the realtors who were solicited and the
clients of the realtors who were to be future clients of the attorneys.'°°
An attorney who receives referrals from a realtor could not adequately advocate the position of a client against that realtor.' 01 The
state has "'a substantial governmental interest in preventing conflicts
of interest . . . for which there is no adequately protective less
restrictive alternative." ' ' 0 2 The court therefore upheld the decision
of the Appellate Division against the attorneys. 03

94. 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982). The facts of Moses are stated at 231 Kan. at
244.
95. Id. at 245, 642 P.2d at 1006.
96. Id. at 246, 642 P.2d at 1007.
97. Id..
98. 60 N.Y.2d 229, 457 N.E.2d 682, 469 N.Y.S.2d 577, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
The facts of Alessi are stated at 60 N.Y.2d at 231-32.
99. Id. at 231, 457 N.E.2d at 684, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
100. Id. at 233, 457 N.E.2d at 686, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
101. Id. at 234, 457 N.E.2d at 687, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 582 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 232, 457 N.E.2d at 685, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (quoting Matter of Greene, 54
N.Y.2d 118, 127, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883, 892, 429 N.E.2d 390, 399 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S.
1035 (1982)).
103. 60 N.Y.2d at 234, 457 N.E.2d at 687, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
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In a case arising out of the partial collapse of a building, In re
von Wiegen,' °4 the New York Court of Appeals again dealt with a
direct mail case. Eric von Wiegen sent letters to 250 victims and
their families of the Hyatt skywalk collapse in Kansas City, Missouri.
The letters claimed that a litigation committee had been formed to
assist the victims and that von Wiegen had been retained by many
of the victims. The Committee consisted only of von Wiegen and
his secretary, and no victims had retained him.
The New York Court of Appeals started with the proposition that
there is a distinction between personal and mailed solicitation.' 05 In
the case of the latter, a state may regulate mailings but it may not
prohibit them entirely.1°6 As this mailing did not relate to an unlawful
activity nor was it misleading, the court examined the governmental
interests involved in preventing such a mailing. Such mailings, the
state alleged, give rise to the possibility of over-commercialization,
invasion of privacy, undue influence, stirring up litigation, and the
potential for deception. '°" The court concluded that none of these
interests was of a sufficient magnitude to override the public's interest
in receiving information on the availability of legal services. 0 8 The
last two parts of the Central Hudson test ask whether the restrictions
directly advance the governmental interest in question and whether
there is a less drastic alternative. The New York Court of Appeals
found that a copy of the mailing could be filed with the state and
therefore a complete ban would be unconstitutional. Thus it dismissed
the charge of direct mail solicitation. °9 However, the court did
affirm the finding that the mailings in question were deceptive." '0
A California case dealing with this question is Leoni v. State Bar
of California."' In that case attorneys Slate and Leoni engaged in
the mailing of 250,000 letters and pamphlets between November 1978
and July 1980, after the decision in Bates was published. The
pamphlets were of a general informational nature and were included
in the mailing based on the type of proceeding in which the addressee
was involved. The firm revised the material over time to make certain
nothing in the mailings was misleading.
In 1981 the State Bar brought a disciplinary action against the
attorneys as a result of complaints by other attorneys and their
clients who had been misled by the mailings. The California Supreme

104. 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40, cert denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985).
The facts of von Wiegen are stated at 63 N.Y.2d at 166-68.
105. Id. at 170, 470 N.E.2d 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d 47.
106. Id. at 166, 470 N.E.2d 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d 43.
107. Id. at 168, 470 N.E.2d 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d 45.
108. Id. at 169-70, 470 N.E.2d 844-45, 481 N.Y.S.2d 46-7.
109. Id. at 170, 470 N.E.2d 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d 47.
110. Id. at 168, 470 N.E.2d 843, 481 N.Y.S.2d 45.
I11. 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1985). The facts of Leoni are
stated at 39 Cal. 3d at 614-621.
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Court found the mailings to be commercial speech. The court ruled
that it had, consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions,
the power to regulate misleading advertising. ' 2 The court then considered whether it could prohibit an advertising campaign that explains the status of the recipients' cases and debtors' legal rights
and remedies. The rule in question prohibited misleading messages.
The court found these letters to be misleading. Therefore, it held
the rule could constitutionally be applied in this case. It did note,
however, that the rule could not prohibit mass mailings that are
3
not false or misleading."1
These states tended to equate the use of direct mailings with inperson solicitation. They viewed a person using such promotional
devices much like a person who visits an accident victim in his
hospital bed. The similarity between the two seems strained. A person
who is in the physical presence of an attorney is much more likely
to be influenced than a person who reads a letter. Furthermore, a
great number of persons may throw the letter away the moment
they realize it is a mere business solicitation. In light of the very
real differences between the two, there is much less justification for
a blanket prohibition on direct mailings than for a blanket prohibition
on in-person solicitation. This is the position adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in its most recent
attorney advertising case,
4
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association. "
V. THE PRESENT STATUS OF DIRECT MAIL
ADVERTISING: SHAPERO V. KENTUCKY BAR
ASSOCIA TION
After the decision in Zauderer, attorney Richard Shapero submitted, pursuant to a Kentucky Supreme Court rule, a proposed
form letter to the Kentucky Bar's Advertising Commission. Shapero
hoped to send this form letter to potential clients whose homes were
being foreclosed. The Commission found that the proposed letter
violated Kentucky's rule which prohibited solicitation precipitated
by a specific event or occurrence or which related to the addressees
as distinct from the general public." 5 The letter was not found to
be false, misleading, or deceptive. Shapero then requested an opinion

112.
113.
114.
20.
115.

39 Cal. 3d at 619, 704 P.2d at 193, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
39 Cal. 3d at 621, 704 P.2d at 195, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
108 S.Ct. 1916 (1988). The facts of Shapero are stated in the opinion at pp. 1919-

Id.. The rule in question, Supreme Court Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i), provided:
A written advertisement may be sent or delivered to an individual addressee
only if that addressee is one of a class of persons, other than a family, to
whom it is also sent or delivered at or about the same time, and only if it
is not prompted or precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving
or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general public.
Id. at 1919-20 n.2.
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from the ethics committee which also disapproved of the letter.
Shapero then petitioned for a review of the letter in question by
the Kentucky Supreme Court.
The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the rule in question was
in conflict with the United States Supreme Court holdings in In re
R.M.J. and Zauderer and ordered it deleted." 6 The decision was
based on the requirement that regulations of commercial speech must
be based on a substantial governmental interest that is directly served
by prohibiting solicitation1 7 by direct mail targeted to persons with
a specific legal problem.'
The court observed that a state has a governmental interest in
prohibiting solicitation that is deceptive. It analogized this case to
the Ohralik case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld
the right of the state of Ohio to ban in-person solicitation. The
court held that direct targeted mail may be prohibited for the same
reasons in-person solicitations may be banned by states."'
On the other hand, the court distinguished targeted mailings aimed
at a specific person from general mailings not addressed to a specific
situation. Such letters struck the members of the court as less
dangerous than targeted mailings."19 It therefore affirmed the decision
.of the ethics committee. In place of Kentucky's rule on direct mail
advertising the court adopted the American Bar Association's Rule
7.3.120

116. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 S.W.2d 299, 300 (1987). The court noted that
the United States Supreme Court in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), had struck down a
ban on targeted direct mail engaged in for nonpecuniary reasons.
117. Id. at 300.
118. Id. at 301. The court reasoned:
This Court is not unmindful of the serious potential for abuse inherent in
direct solicitation by lawyers of potential clients known to need specific legal
services. Such solicitation subjects the prospective client to pressure from a
trained lawyer in a direct personal way. It is entirely possible that the potential
client may feel overwhelmed by the basic situation which caused the need
for the specific legal services and may have a seriously impaired capacity
for good judgment, sound reason and a natural protective self-interest. Such
a condition is full of the possibility of undue influence, overreaching and
intimidation.
Id.
119. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the idea that submission of a blank form
letter to the Advertising Commission would protect the public from overreaching, intimidation,
or misleading statements. Id.
120. Id. Rule 7.3 reads as follows:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by
mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing
so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in
person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other
communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters
addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known
to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular
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The United States Supreme Court viewed the central issue in this
case as whether a state may "categorically prohibit lawyers from
soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and
nondeceptive letters
to potential clients known to face particular
' 21
legal problems."'

Justice Brennan noted that the Zauderer decision makes it clear
that because a lawyer has a constitutional right to advertise in a
local newspaper, the lawyer consequently has a right to send the
same information to the public by way of a general mailing. Justice
Brennan rejected the analogy of the Kentucky Supreme Court to
the decision in Ohralik, arguing instead that people will be overwhelmed by their personal problems whether they receive a general
mailing or a targeted mailing. Consequently, the judgment of any
such person would be impaired whether he or she received a specific
matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such services
useful.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
The problem with adopting a rule that permits general mailings, but prohibits mailings
targeted to the needs of a specific audience, is that one could reach exactly the same people
simply by engaging in a mass mailing. The end product of this would be that the very same
message would reach the targeted audience anyway. A rule prohibiting targeted mailings
simply makes it more expensive to reach specific persons. This point was recognized by Justice
Brennan in his decision in this case on appeal to the United States Supreme Court where
he wrote:
The court below disapproved petitioner's proposed letter solely because it
targeted only persons who were "known to need [the] legal services" offered
in his letter, 726 S.W.2d at 301, rather than the broader group of persons
"so situated that they might in general find such services useful." Generally,
unless the advertiser is inept, the latter group would include members of the
former. The only reason to disseminate an advertisement of particular legal
services among those persons who are "so situated that they might in general
find such services useful" is to reach individuals who actually "need legal
services of the kind provided [and advertised] by the lawyer."
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 1921 (1988).
Furthermore, such a rule ignores the fact that many people with specific legal needs might
be very interested in receiving such literature. Far from regarding such mailings negatively,
it is quite likely that the recipients would be glad to know a particular attorney handles
cases dealing with their legal problems.
121. Shapero v Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 1919 (1988). The opinion was written
by Justice Brennan. Justices. White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy joined in
Parts I and It.Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy joined in Part 1i1. Justice White
filed an opinion concurring and dissenting in part in which Stevens joined. Justice O'Connor
wrote a dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined.
The proposed letter, to be sent to persons whose homes were being foreclosed, read as
'follows:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this
is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you
to keep your home by ORDERING your creditor (sic] to STOP and give
you more time to pay them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE
information on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for
you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE,
there is NO charge for calling.
Id. at 1919.
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or a general mailing. The relevant inquiry is whether "the mode of
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any
such susceptibility. 1 12 2 Letters do not involve the risk of overreaching
and undue influence that are present when an attorney personally
solicits business. 23 However, a personalized letter could be deceptive.
Even so, the Court found that any possible abuses could be regulated
2 It
by the state in a less restrictive manner than an absolute ban.
might be more work for a state agency to review solicitation letters,
but this is not a sufficient basis for banning them.'
In Part III of his opinion 2 6 Justice Brennan noted that the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine does not apply to professional
advertising cases, therefore he examined whether the letter in question
was particularly overreaching. 27 Shapero's letter used underscored,
uppercase letters. Secondly, it contained assertions such as "It may
surprise you what I may be able to do for you," which in the eyes
of the state bar association were pure puffery because they did not
state an objective fact. Justice Brennan decided that the letter presented no comparable risk of overreaching to that of an attorney
who personally solicits business. "[T]he State may claim no substantial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicitations to those least likely to be read by the recipient."'' 2 A
state may not ban potentially misleading information if that information may be presented in a way that is not deceptive unless the
state asserts a substantial state interest that such a restriction would
directly advance. 2 9 A state must also be able to assert a substantial
state interest that is directly advanced by any restriction on potentially
misleading information. 3 0 No such substantial interest was asserted
by the Kentucky Bar Association in this case. A letter may be
misleading but the Kentucky Bar Association did not argue that
point in this case.' 3 '

122. Id. at 1922. Justice Brennan observed that the Court's decision in Ohralik turned on
two factors. One was that a face-to-face solicitation could easily lead to overreaching, invasion
of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978). Secondly, it would be virtually impossible to monitor
in-person solicitation in the absence of a total ban. Id. at 466. 108 S.Ct. at 1922.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1923. Justice Brennan suggested that a state could require a lawyer to file such
letters with a state agency. Id.
125. Id. at 1924.
126. Justices White and Stevens did not join in this part of the decision. They thought
that this matter should be left to the state courts. Id. at 1925 (White, J., concurring and
dissenting in part).
127. Id. at 1924.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
130. Id. at 1924.
131. Id. at 1925. Justice Brennan observed "To be sure, a letter may be misleading if it
unduly emphasizes trivial or 'relatively uninformative fact[s]' ...
or offers overblown assurances of client satisfaction." Id.
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Justice O'Connor wrote a dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia joined. Justice O'Connor's primary objection was
not that the Court's decision is illogical in light of its prior decisions
but that the prior decisions were incorrect in the first place. 13 2 Justice
O'Connor thought there was a significant difference between the
sale of professional services and the sale of standardized products
and felt that merely receiving a letter from an attorney is intimidating
to the average person. Furthermore, the use of personalized letters
suggests that the sender possesses some special knowledge of the
recipient, and such letters are difficult to police.'
Justice O'Connor believed that states should have considerable
latitude in banning potentially misleading advertising. She viewed
even the advertisement in the Bates case as inherently misleading
34
because there is no such thing as a routine divorce or bankruptcy.
In O'Conner's view, the use of the word "free" in Shapero's letter
was entitled to even less constitutional protection than the mere
price advertising of legal services in Bates. On the whole, she found
the American Bar Association's Model Rule of Professional Conduct
7.3 constitutional under the Central Hudson test. 3 '
Justice O'Connor observed that lawyers are experts with respect
to information that can not be made generally available to the
public. In such a situation, an attorney might be tempted to manipulate the system for his or her own ends. One way is by engaging
in overzealous representation of clients. The other way is by abuse
of the client for the lawyer's benefit. It is unrealistic in light of a
lawyer's special expertise that clients be expected to bargain for legal
36
services as if they were purchasing automobiles.
She concludes:.

132. Id. at 1925 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
.133. Id. at 1926 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 1928 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor saw the providing of legal services
as something radically different from selling products.
One distinguishing feature of any profession, unlike other occupations that
may be equally respectable, is that membership entails an ethical obligation
to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to the
standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal fiat or through
the discipline of the market. There are sound reasons to continue pursuing
the goal that is implicit in the traditional view of professional life. Both the
special privileges incident to membership in the profession and the advantages
those privileges give in the necessary task of earning a living are means to
a goal that transcends the accumulation of wealth. That goal is public service,
which in the legal profession can take a variety of familiar forms. This view
of the legal profession need not be rooted in romanticism or self-serving
sanctimony, though of course it can be. Rather, special ethical standards for
lawyers are properly understood as an appropriate means of restraining lawyers
in the exercise of the unique power that they inevitably wield in a political
system like ours.
Id. at 1929-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 1930 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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In my judgment, however, fairly severe constraints on attorney
advertising can continue to play an important role in preserving
the legal profession as a genuine profession. Whatever may be
the exactly appropriate scope of these restrictions at a given time
and place, this Court's recent decisions reflect a myopic belief
that "consumers," and thus our nation, will benefit from a
constitutional theory that refuses to recognize either the essence
of professionalism or its fragile and necessary foundations.,3 '

VI. DIRECT MAIL AS CONTRASTED TO GENERAL
ADVERTISING
Shapero further clarifies the law with respect to promoting one's
professional services. In Zauderer, the Court struck down state rules
that prohibited an attorney from suggesting in newspaper advertising
that people might have legal problems and then recommending himself or herself in the advertisement. A truthful, nondeceptive advertisement of this nature may not be prohibited by the states.
Shapero merely follows up on the rule announced in Zauderer by
declaring that a lawyer may recommend himself or herself either by
newspaper advertising or by direct mail.
The doors are clearly open now to attorneys who wish to use
Yellow Pages advertising, newspaper or magazine advertising, or
direct mail. The only question left for attorneys is which medium
they ought to use in order to promote their legal practices.
There are a number of advantages associated with direct mail that
make it the most sensible alternative for attorneys to utilize., 38 Mass
advertising in a newspaper of general circulation costs a great deal
of money. Unfortunately, the advertiser must pay to reach a great
number of persons who are not interested in the advertiser's message.
This is a particularly acute problem if the advertising attorney wishes
to advertise a specialized service or reach a group of persons with
very particular legal needs. To reach these people through mass
media advertising would require the attorney to transmit his message
to vast numbers of people he or she does not want to reach.
To circumvent this problem, an attorney who wishes to advertise
should utilize direct mail. The foremost advantage to it from the
standpoint of a lawyer who wishes to advertise a very specific service
is that the advertising message can be targeted to a very specific

137. Id. at 1931 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The problem with this position is that it fails

to recognize the need of the public for information about specific lawyers and the anticom:
petitive aspects of rules designed to prohibit advertising by lawyers. Returning to the prior
rules that prohibited lawyer advertising would simply increase consumer confusion and increase
the costs of legal services. Quite a price for the public to pay.
138. See Whitman, Direct Mail. supra note 30, at 416-419.
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addience. 1 9 In addition, it obviously costs less to send out a small
number of letters to a select group of recipients than to take out
an advertisement in a large metropolitan daily newspaper.
Other advantages associated with direct mail are: (1) the length,
timing, and form of message can be better controlled with direct
mail than other advertising media; (2) it is rather easy to determine
if the advertisement is productive; and (3) mail order testing produces
more accurate results than does the testing of other advertising
methods. "4
VII. CONCLUSION
With Shapero, the United States Supreme Court has taken yet
another step toward clarifying the law with respect to attorney
advertising. Just a decade ago attorneys found it impossible to
advertise, but since that time the Court has gradually diminished
the ability of the states to prohibit lawyers from engaging in advertising.
Zauderer clearly established the rule that attorneys may place
advertisements which educate the public about specific legal services
and also recommend that readers hire them. The Court expanded
this rule in Shapero by stating that an attorney may utilize the same
type of promotion through direct mail.
However, there are still some limitations on attorney advertising.
An attorney may not use false, misleading, or deceptive statements
in his or her advertising or direct mailings.' 4 ' Some courts also have
found a conflict of interest when an attorney asks others for referrals
of specific types of clients.' 42
It remains unclear whether attorneys may use the telephone, telegraph, or fax machine to convey truthful advertising. It is possible
that the Supreme Court may come to view these means of personal
promotion as more intrusive on the recipients' privacy and therefore
permit states to outlaw the use of these means of communication.
With its ruling in Shapero, however, the Court has clearly moved
the bar in the direction of permitting virtually all legal advertising
that is neither false, deceptive, or misleading.

139.
rather
84 (3d
140.
141.
142.

Mail order marketers often compare direct mail to shooting a prospect with a rifle
than a shotgun. See SIMON, How TO START AND OPERATE A MAIL ORDER BusINEss
ed. 1981).
See Whitman, Direct Mail, supra note 30, at'417-18.
Shapero, 108 S.Ct. at 1921.
See, e.g., Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927 (1980).

